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Abstract 
This policy paper presents the main findings of research on international assistance to 
Southeast Europe (SEE) and on the working of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe 
(SP). The intention of the research has been to evaluate international involvement in the 
region with a view of developing recommendations on how to avoid repeating past 
mistakes, how to improve future involvement, and how to encourage regional 
cooperation. The paper presents and evaluates alternative policy options to a number of 
identified problems. On the basis of the evaluation of these options, I develop 
recommendations on how to deal with the current problems of international assistance 
to SEE and the deficiencies of the SP.  
 
Introduction 
Developments in SEE and the prospects for regional cooperation have come to depend 
on international assistance, and particularly on the involvement of the EU. Significant 
international aid has been committed to the task of stabilization, democratization, 
economic reconstruction and regional cooperation in SEE. With the end of the 
reconstruction period approaching, most SEE countries are to see international 
assistance being progressively scaled down. Yet, the post-reconstruction phase finds 
most of these countries grappling with serious economic and social problems. Regional 
cooperation in SEE has stalled, too. These problems call for a careful evaluation of 
international involvement in the region with a view of developing recommendations on 
how to avoid repeating past mistakes, how to improve future involvement, and how to 
encourage regional cooperation. 
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Problem Description  
Despite the undoubted success of foreign aid in overcoming the direct damages of the 
conflicts, assessments of its overall achievements are mixed. The following problems 
stand out as most pressing. 
 International assistance to SEE is massive but insensitive to local needs and tends 
to impose donor-driven priorities on SEE countries.  
International assistance often fails to adequately take into account local stakeholders’ 
interests and tends to conceive of institutional reform as a self-contained effort 
disconnected from the existing structures of power, the interests, and the traditions in 
the recipient society.  
Often donors fail to respond to the real needs of the aid beneficiaries. The problem is 
particularly acute in the case of democracy assistance where the bulk of assistance is 
disbursed through NGOs in the recipient countries that are financially dependent on 
international funds and tend to comply with the priorities of the donors rather than with 
the needs of the recipients. Even the SP - the initiative that most loudly and tediously 
declares the need to achieve ‘regional ownership’- has a dubious record of facilitating 
local involvement. 
International assistance, especially a massive one like in Bosnia and Kosovo, is not 
necessarily a blessing for state institutions. It can make them aid-dependent and can 
thus weaken their capacity and their status in the recipient society. The discrepancy 
between externally determined priorities and the urgent needs of the SEE societies 
undermines the political elite’s responsiveness and accountability to the electorate and 
thus exacerbates the crisis of democratic representation. This discrepancy can be felt 
even in the countries with a lesser degree of international intervention. 
 The effectiveness of international assistance programs has been undermined by 
the lack of coordination among donors and by the resulting short-termism and 
support of isolated and unsustainable projects. 
The tendency to perceive of projects as an end in themselves rather than as part of a 
more comprehensive strategy of development or policy change thwarts their long-term 
effectiveness and decreases their sustainability. In many cases projects that have started 
to show perceptible results have been abandoned by the donors due to change of 
priorities and thus, due to the low levels of sustainability, abandoned altogether. Still 
many other projects are from the very beginning designed to be short-term ones. 
Training initiatives and capacity building are often of such type. They last for a limited 
period of time, involve little follow up, and pay insufficient attention to the necessity to 
disseminate the newly acquired skills more widely in the institutions involved. The SP 
has a bad record of ensuring sustainability. The taskforces, initiatives, and projects that 
are most likely to last beyond SP funding are usually projects that have existed before 
the SP got involved in them; the sustainability of newly developed projects and 
networks is dubious at best. Support for institution building also consists of isolated 
projects with modest goals, over-reliant on seminars and conferences as ways of 
transmitting skills. There is still a stress on capacity building. Capacity building might 
have been justified in the initial phases of international involvement, but this phase is 
coming to a close.  
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The phenomenon of isolated and unsustainable projects largely stems from lack of 
coordination among donors and competition for higher visibility. Yet, however great the 
need for coordinating international assistance, piling up new coordination schemes on 
top of others is not only unlikely to be effective, but might end up having outright 
negative consequences. 
 The SP is facing some specific problems.  
-The taskforces receive insubstantial institutional support and there is a perceived need 
to provide them with at least a minimal paid staff that would help offload the 
substantial logistical work currently performed by volunteers.  
-The emphasis on high-cost infrastructure projects is a questionable strategy from a 
developmental point of view.  
 International donors have committed funds to the task of encouraging regional 
cooperation but the supported projects have not been very successful in achieving 
these goals.  
The more advanced participants from the region have been dissatisfied with the unitary 
approach applied in such projects. The different countries in the region are facing 
increasingly different problems and are increasingly diverging as regards institutional 
capacity, legislation, advancement in reforms, etc.  
In many cases when a country has been invited to participate in a regional project about 
which it has not been consulted, its involvement has been faint. Similarly, in the cases 
when one or several ‘lead’ countries have been identified to carry out the project, the 
other participants from the region have for a long time not been engaged in the project 
in any way other than taking part in trainings. They have remained inactive and 
unenthusiastic about those projects.  
 International assistance to civil society is also fraud with problems.  
Local civil society groups are almost totally dependent on donors. In fact, many NGOs 
‘do’ civil society work in order to make a living. This has curbed the ability of such 
organizations to establish closer links with, and respond to, their constituencies. Civil 
society assistance, however, has wrongly tended to conceive of its task in terms of 
technical assistance and mere allocation of resources. In addition, it has induced 
centralization and creation of hierarchical structures within recipient organizations and 
within the NGO sector as a whole.  
Recent research on the strategies of international NGOs has pointed out that in terms of 
sustainability and relevance reactive strategies have achieved superior results compared 
to proactive strategies because, rather than imposing solutions in a top-down fashion, 
the former are better suited to solicit proposals and ideas from the recipient society.  
Last but not least, many of the problems of international assistance are related to the 
inadequately optimistic expectations of its likely impact. It is the pressure on donors to 
demonstrate apparent results that probably explains the stress on more proactive and 
interventionist strategies as opposed to more subtle and time-consuming reactive 
strategies based on efforts to attract local staff, to acquire understanding of the local 
circumstances and to create partnerships with local stakeholders. 
 Regional cooperation in SEE is hampered by the genuine unwillingness of most 
SEE countries to get involved in any form of SEE regionalism.  
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-  The symbolic politics in the region cause SEE countries to be staunchly weary of SEE 
regionalism. The perception is that regional integration associates them with a region 
classified as ‘backward’ and thus damages their international reputation. In addition, 
European and regional integration in many respects appear to work at cross-purposes. 
The regional approach implied in the SP arouses fears among the more advanced SEE 
countries that participation in regional cooperation initiatives will delay their EU 
integration. Thus, the unifying tendencies suggested by the EU’s insistence on regional 
cooperation prove unacceptable to virtually every country in SEE.  
-  Regional cooperation is designated as a panacea for a variety of problems and 
frequently becomes a substitute for in-depth understanding of existing problems and 
possible solutions. 
 
Policy Options  
The need for adapting any foreign assistance strategy to ensure adequate local input into 
assistance programs’ design and implementation has emerged as a new consensus 
among critics of international assistance. This new consensus has a potential to make 
some useful corrections in the paradigm of international assistance. Yet, being as it is a 
revolt against the previously unreflective and overly optimistic view about the ability of 
direct international intervention to promote desired changes, it tends to overestimate the 
ability of local input to solve the salient problems. Hence, while local input should be 
encouraged, it does not automatically provide solutions. 
Policy options for improving the priorities of international assistance with a view of 
addressing the urgent needs of SEE countries.   
¾ The recent proposal of the European Stability Initiative (ESI) that EU 
assistance to the Western Balkans should be refocused to address longer-term 
developmental and structural problems deserves serious attention. The existing EU and 
international strategies in the Western Balkans have been defined in accordance with the 
goals of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization and are no longer adequate to 
current problems. However, this proposal is mostly applicable to EU assistance. Other 
donors are likely to be unwilling to sacrifice their own agendas. 
¾ While the EU should focus on developmental issues, other donors should be 
encouraged to gradually shift away from projects dealing exclusively with civil society, 
ethnic relations or human rights, and to move towards an integrated approach that 
combines reconstruction and economic development efforts with efforts at rebuilding 
and reintegrating local communities and solving ethnic problems by involving all 
community stakeholders into a common endeavor. While such projects are immediately 
relevant to post-conflict situations, they also seem well suited for application, with some 
modification, to border regions in SEE. This approach could be more effective in 
fostering regional cooperation and good neighborly relations than an approach solely 
focused on ethnicity and minorities. 
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Policy options for increasing local input into the planning of EU assistance with a view 
of making EU assistance more relevant to the needs of SEE countries.   
¾ A case can be made for introducing mechanisms to screen external 
intervention within the SAp, which would link access to finance from western aid 
agencies to compliance with certain criteria. This option in effect proposes to solve the 
problems of extensive international involvement with even more international 
involvement. It is, however, inadequate in addressing the need to ensure increased 
participation of SEE governments in decisions regarding international intervention.  
¾ A second solution, proposed by the European Stability Initiative (ESI), is that 
EU assistance follow the developmental principles inbuilt into the EU structural funds: 
local co-financing, institutionalized partnership between the Commission, national and 
sub-national authorities, and multi-annual programming of developmental efforts. The 
principle of co-financing can help prevent distortions in domestic spending patterns and 
enhance the capacity for local and regional governance.  
However, the Structural Fund approach cannot automatically remove the problem of 
sub-optimal priorities. The principle of co-financing was applied in ISPA but was not 
unproblematic. First, the crucial question is what is meant by ‘local co-financing’. ISPA 
defines ‘local co-financing’ as one of three possible types of financing: local public 
finances; loans from the European Investment Bank or another International Financial 
Institution (IFI); or commercial (private) funding. In reality, also bilateral donors have 
acted as co-financers. Clearly, if the bulk of the co-financing comes in the form of a loan 
from an IFI or another donor (as it is likely to do, given the scarcity of local public 
finance in SEE countries), the positive effects in terms of local input in setting priorities 
and in terms of capacity building are dubious. Such practice might also unduly increase 
foreign debt. A number of currently undertaken infrastructure projects in CEE and SEE 
countries funded by IFIs have been charged with neglecting environmental standards 
routinely observed in the EU itself and, having been chosen on the basis of 
predominantly political and geopolitical criteria, are questionable from an economic 
point of view. In addition, for a number of reasons, including restricted capacities of 
local institutions, it is not ensured that the requirement for co-financing would result in 
local governments helping to set the optimal priorities for economic development. In 
this case, local co-financing would achieve little more than substitute locally chosen sub-
optimal priorities for externally imposed sub-optimal priorities.  
¾ The requirement for local co-financing is appropriate but priority should be 
given first, to financing from commercial (private) sources, and second, to local public 
financing. The ability to use loans from IFIs as a co-financing source should be restricted 
and subjected to stricter rules regarding the economic feasibility and the environmental 
impact of projects. 
As the requirement for co-financing does not automatically solve the problem of sub-
optimal priorities, it should be coupled with an improvement of the mechanism for setting 
priorities that would allow for sufficient local input in international and EU assistance. 
SEE governments should be encouraged to set comprehensive and concrete 
developmental strategies and priorities, with indications of financial assistance needed, 
in a National Multi-Year Developmental Program. These programs are to be regularly 
updated.   
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As SEE governments’ capacity for such programming is currently constrained, it is 
necessary to put in place a consultation mechanism on the Developmental Program 
between the European Commission and the respective government. The mechanism 
could follow the example of the relatively recent practice in Bulgaria and Romania of 
consulting the National Programs for the Adoption of the Acquis Communitaire with the 
European Commission. The practice of presenting the said National Programs to the 
Commission perceptibly improved their quality. It also increased these programs’ local 
political weight and importance. The introduction of such a mechanism will: 
-  ensure that the EU would consider the locally defined priorities;  
-  provide a balanced procedure for the EU to object to priorities and projects deemed 
improper or to propose its own preferred priorities without the possibility for one-
sidedly imposing them;  
-  gradually increase the SEE governments’ capacity for developmental programming.  
In pre-accession support mechanisms to the SEE accession countries- Bulgaria and 
Romania- the above principles to some extent apply. These mechanisms are guided by 
the Accession Partnership priorities which are intended to help applicant countries meet 
the criteria for membership. ISPA is also guided by the transport and environmental 
strategies formulated by the accession countries’ governments in agreement with the 
Commission. However, there is room for improvement in the priority-stetting 
mechanism. A multi-annual developmental program could serve as a coherent 
overarching framework for determining concrete priorities for ISPA and SAPARD 
funding and the elements of PHARE concerned with social and economic cohesion and 
economic reform. This will ensure that the three funds will work towards a single 
purpose. This is in effect similar to what is required from the National Programmes for 
the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAAs), namely to create a coordination mechanism for the 
use of the three funds. The difference is that while the NPAAs deal with aqcuis 
harmonization, the developmental programs deal with the developmental priorities of 
the country and with the possible contribution of EU pre-accession funds to solving 
structural problems.  
Policy options for increasing the relevance of assistance programs of other donors.   
¾ A good case for avoiding over-reliance on foreigners in international 
assistance programs. Short-term appointments of foreign experts or trainers with no 
sufficient knowledge of the local context and language risk undermining assistance 
programs’ relevance. Increasing inclusion of local personnel and staff is indispensable 
not simply because it brings comprehensive knowledge of the local circumstances but 
also because of basic reasons of legitimacy. In addition, the costs associated with 
procuring advice and implementation from foreign experts and consultants are usually 
substantially higher than those of involving locals. Despite its obvious merits, this 
proposal should not be taken to the extreme. 
¾ Another option is that donors make conscious efforts to adapt their program 
designs to the local context with the help of in-depth research of the local conditions 
carried out by experts familiar with the recipient country and its language. This in effect 
means that the donors themselves should ensure improvements in international 
assistance. It is, however, unlikely that such improvements could be achieved without a 
degree of opening up to local staff, unless donors are prepared to be extremely flexible 
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in changing and adapting the program design in a trial-and-error manner in the course 
of implementation, which is difficult to achieve in practice. 
¾ A more balanced alternative exists. The degree to which reliance on western 
expertise might be beneficial depends on the goals of assistance. Western expertise in 
developing and implementing assistance strategies is likely to have a tangible impact on 
the building of new institutions. However, these western experts, e.g. twinners, should 
have a good knowledge of the local conditions and preferably experience in the target 
country. For example, long-term residence of the external experts in the target country 
has as a rule increased the effectiveness of assistance programs and should be 
encouraged.  
Assistance relying heavily on Western expertise can have only limited impact on the 
functioning of local institutions. To address these goals, assistance programs should 
increased their reliance on local personnel and reactive strategies that rely more on local 
initiative than on imported standard solutions.  
Policy options for decreasing the professionalization, aid-dependency and lack of 
sustainability in recipient countries’ NGO sectors.   
¾ It has been suggested that donors should try to avoid centralization (with the 
concomitant disagreement and mistrust) within the recipient NGO sector as a whole by 
spreading out more small grants among a variety of organizations and to avoid 
competition for scarce resources between NGOs. This proposal, however, should not be 
taken to the extreme because supporting a multitude of organizations with small grants 
is likely to exacerbate the problem of lack of sustainability and will further diminish the 
real impact of assistance.   
¾ Another option is to temper the current practice of supporting primarily 
established organizations with a long grant history. This can be achieved by giving out 
grants also to some pre-existing and already functioning, albeit smaller and less established, 
local and less professionalized organizations (e.g. community-based organizations or 
organizations outside the capital). 
Policy options for addressing the problem of unrealistically high expectations of the 
impact of democracy assistance.   
¾ There are recent proposals that western NGOs engaged in democracy 
assistance should also engage in public education regarding the incremental nature of 
democratization. These proposals are adequate but also difficult to put in practice if 
democracy programs continue to rely on a normative and moral rhetoric to justify their 
engagement.  
¾ The second option is that international assistance providers simply tone 
down their current normative rhetoric and instead seek to define their missions with 
down-to-earth limited goals that match their real capabilities. 
Policy options for dealing with the reluctance of SEE countries to engage in SEE 
regionalism.   
¾ One remedy for the tension between European integration and regional 
cooperation has been put forward by proponents of Europeanization. This remedy is 
simply to provide more Europeanization and to make regional cooperation part of EU 
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conditionality. Such an approach has affirmed perceptions of SEE regionalism as a top-
down process mainly dependent on external initiative. The stress on European and 
international interventionism and conditionality unwittingly downplays the role of local 
ownership of the regional cooperation process and compromises its sustainability. 
¾ Another option is that international strategies rely less on conditionality as a 
way to ensure compliance with “regional cooperation” values and instead take into 
account the symbolic politics of the region. This entails avoiding declaratory and 
symbolically loaded language and excessive resort to shaming and patronizing on the 
part of the international actors. The same can be achieved by allowing for “a la carte” 
regional cooperation (among smaller groups of SEE countries) based on pragmatic 
interests and goals. 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
In order to improve the priorities of international assistance with a view of addressing 
the urgent needs of SEE countries 
 1. EU assistance should be refocused to address structural economic, social and 
developmental goals. It is high time to thrust aside the conflict-prevention approach and 
to address currently more pressing problems. Donors other than the EU should be 
encouraged to gradually shift away from projects dealing exclusively with civil society, 
ethnic relations or human rights, and to move towards an integrated approach that 
combines reconstruction, economic development (e.g. rebuilding of houses, encouraging 
small business or agriculture) and social issues (e.g. youth unemployment and other job 
creation programs) with efforts to rebuild and reintegrate local communities and to 
tackle ethnic issues. Such projects are especially well suited for application to border 
regions in SEE.  
In order to increase local input into the planning of EU assistance with a view of making 
EU assistance more relevant to the needs of SEE countries 
2.  SEE governments should be encouraged to set comprehensive and concrete 
developmental strategies and priorities, with indications of financial assistance needed, 
in National Multi-Year Developmental Programs. The programs will be consulted with 
the EU. It is recommended that a consultation mechanism on the Developmental 
Program between the European Commission and the respective government be 
developed. The mechanism could follow the mechanism under which Bulgaria and 
Romania consult their National Programs for the Adoption of the Acquis Communitaire 
with the European Commission. The accession countries- Bulgaria and Romania - 
should aim to make the program a coordinating framework for determining priorities 
for ISPA, SAPARD and PHARE funding. In view of further improving the mechanisms 
for setting developmental priorities, in the mid-term national parliamentary committees 
should be created and tasked to develop a mechanism for consulting the multi-annual 
developmental program presented by the government with local non-state actors, most 
notably trade unions and employers’ organizations.  
3.  A requirement for local co-financing of EU assistance should be introduced. 
However, priority should be given first, to local co-financing from commercial (private) 
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sources, and second, to local public financing. The ability to use loans from IFIs as a co-
financing source should be restricted and subjected to stricter rules regarding the 
economic feasibility and the environmental impact of projects. 
In order to increase the relevance of assistance programs funded by other donors to local 
needs  
4.  It is necessary to adapt assistance programs’ design in accordance with the local 
context and with the goals of the assistance program. Assistance that aims to influence 
the building of new institutions may use western expertise relatively extensively. 
However, western experts and twinners should not be flying in and out for short 
consultancy sessions. Long-term engagement with, and physical residency in, the target 
country is necessary.   
5.  Assistance aimed at improving the functioning of local institutions should consider 
relying more on local staff. Such assistance programs should be more reactive and 
should let local initiative lead the way rather than try to impose imported standard 
solutions.  
6.  Generally, the period when programs focused on capacity building and training by 
western experts were necessary is coming to an end. Donors should consider shifting 
towards supporting problem-driven projects identified as urgent by the target 
organizations and institutions.  
7.  In post-conflict areas in ex-Yugoslavia projects focused exclusively on basic human 
rights, minorities and refugees, ethnic reconciliation, and physical reconstruction are 
becoming less appropriate. The inertia in donor strategies and the upholding of a 
separate ethnic-conflict-centered agenda for SEE comes at the expense of more pressing 
developmental and social problems and should be reconsidered. See recommendation 1.   
8.  Donors’ requirement that recipient NGOs identify one person (director) who should 
assume the responsibility for administering a grant has led to the creation of hierarchical 
structures and a relative centralization within recipient organizations. This practise 
should be avoided in order to prevent further centralization and professionalization of 
the recipient organizations that would further remove them from their constituencies.  
9.  Donors should also try to avoid centralization within the recipient country’s NGO 
sector as a whole, and should try to increase sustainability and decrease donor 
dependence. The practice of supporting primarily established organizations with a long 
grant history should be tempered by giving out grants also to pre-existing and already 
functioning, albeit smaller and less established, local and less professionalized 
organizations. 
10.  Due to serious problems of sustainability and limited actual impact, projects aiming 
at formulating best practices should target areas that are relatively developed 
economically rather than the most underdeveloped ones. 
In order to address the problem of inflated expectations about democracy assistance and 
to decrease the pressure on donors to produce immediate and visible results 
11.  Western agencies engaging in democracy promotion and international aid should 
substantially tone down their rhetoric and should avoid moral judgments and 
justifications.  They should define their mission with down-to-earth, limited, goals 
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rather than with ideological and normative statements like building democratic societies 
or bringing stability, prosperity and Europeanization to SEE (and other regions).  
In order to improve the design and implementation of regional projects in the SP and 
projects on a regional scale funded by other international actors 
12.  The format of such projects should be reconsidered and the number of participating 
SEE countries should be limited to only those that have clear pragmatic interest in the 
particular project and are expected to actively work on it. 
13.  Regional projects should not be designed by one external organization and then 
imposed on regional participants. Projects should either be designed by the countries 
that have interest in participating in them or consulted with these countries in advance.  
14.  In regional projects there is scope for using experts from other SEE counties rather 
than western or European experts. This especially concerns experts from Bulgaria and 
Romania since the two countries are relatively advanced in the process of adoption of 
the aqcuis that other SEE countries are going through or will soon be going through. This 
will have two beneficial effects. First, financial costs will be lowered. Second, regional 
cooperation on practical issues will be encouraged. Third, this strategy is unlikely to 
anger the countries most reluctant to engage in the region’s affairs so much as the 
‘regional approach’ to solving common problems. Making use of such consulting 
mechanisms requires that countries like Bulgaria develop regulations that would allow 
public officials to perform such duties without implicitly or explicitly breaching the 
rules of employment in public office. 
In order to improve the efficiency of the SP 
15.  In order to encourage and facilitate the involvement of local actors, the SP needs to 
reconsider the current practice of frequently sparing itself the difficulties of providing 
feedback. Requirements and application details need to be communicated to the local 
participants in an appropriate (from the point of view of the local participants as well as 
the SP) way. This means developing clear requirements and criteria, and subsequently 
communicating them to the SEE participants through the National Organizing 
Committees or the National Working Groups and through an accessible web 
presentation.  
16.  The SP should ensure financing for regional meetings that could facilitate the 
development of regional ties, exchange of expertise, and habits of regional cooperation. 
In line with this recommendation and recommendations below, there is a rationale for 
diverting a small fraction (2-3%) of donor aid passing through the SP towards SP 
structures. This could enable the SP to provide institutional assistance to the taskforces. 
The latter goal could be facilitated by the establishment of small country offices (possibly 
hosting several taskforces rather than just one) with a minimal paid staff that would help 
offload the enormity of the logistical work currently done by volunteers. The office 
should be a joint endeavor between the executive and the taskforces in order to 
guarantee that public authorities will have a degree of commitment to it and that public 
officials will be involved in SP activities at a very early stage. These recommendations, 
however, are conditioned on the discontinuation of support of taskforces that are either 
inactive or duplicate existing coordinating mechanisms. 
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17.  The SP should focus on facilitating coordination among donors. For the purpose, it 
should avoid wasting resources on creating taskforces and similar bodies in areas 
overpopulated with coordination mechanisms, e.g. corruption. If the Office of the 
Special representative is provided with adequate financing, it should attempt to monitor 
the implementation of projects. It should seek to facilitate complementarity between 
different sources of financing with the idea to ensure that in the cases of successful 
initiatives new donors (especially the EU) take over where others withdraw.  
18. There is little international assistance could do in terms of coordination if regional 
governments have not decided on clear priorities for themselves. Hence, the SP should 
encourage regional governments to formulate their priorities with respect to 
international assistance. See recommendation 2. 
19.  The SP needs to carefully consider its priorities. The resort to geopolitical criteria in 
infrastructure project selection needs to be minimized. The focus on infrastructure in 
general should not be exclusive. Areas that need heightened attention are, for example, 
measures to increase investment in the SEE region; high-intensity programs of 
institution-building that rely on profound knowledge of the idiosyncratic reform needs 
of each SEE country and each particular institution; and issues of sustainable 
development, employment creation, health and education. 
20.  It is likely that the potential benefits of a regional free trade area are not widely 
recognized by the SEE countries. It is advisable that the arguments related to the hub-
and-spoke problem (see final research report) are brought up, explained, and offered for 
consideration when free trade in the region is being discussed within the SP. This could 
be a way for the SP to solicit a more enthusiastic reception of free trade initiatives in the 
region.   
In order to overcome the reluctance of SEE countries to engage in regional cooperation 
21.  It is recommended that international strategies take into account the symbolic 
politics of the region. Declaratory and symbolically loaded language and excessive 
resort to shaming and patronizing on the part of the international actors are 
counterproductive.  
22.  “A la carte” versions of regional cooperation (among smaller groups of SEE 
countries) could overcome the impediments to regional association engendered by the 
region’s symbolic politics.  
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